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ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THEOPTIMALRETIREMENT AGE:
AN EITIRICAL INVESTIGATION
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how the structure of earnings and pension oppor-
tunities affects retirement behavior. We use a life cycle model of
labor supply, paying special attention to the institutional
features of private pensions and Social Security benefits. This
theoretical formulation is used to develop comparative dynamic pre-
dictions and to guide empirical modelling. Data from a new survey
of workers and their income alternatives are used to implement the
empirical model. Along the way, we highlight a number of interesting
and little known facts about older workers' income. Contrary to
popular opinion we find that private pensions are not always
actuarially neutral; Social Security benefits do not typically
decline (in present value terms) the longer retirement is deferred;
and for many people, retirement income approaches and even exceeds
net labor income. On the basis of empirical estimates of retirement
paramaters, we conclude that (1) people with higher base incomes
retire earlier, and (2) those who have more to gain by postponing
retirement, retire later. These findings are relevant to proposed
reforms of the Social Security system as well as pension programs.
Gary S. Fields
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Social Security and pension reforms are under current policy discussion)
It is of interest to determine how older workers' retirement behavior responds
to the structure of earnings and pensions. However, the empirical record
on this issue is in substantial disagreement as to the magnitudes and even
the signs of key economic variables. This paper provides new estimates of the
effects of earnings, private pensions, and Social Security retirement behavior,
and seeks to resolve some of the contradictions encountered to date in the
empirical literature.
Existing theoretical retirement models are quite well developed.
2
They
typically focus on the decision variable over which older individuals have
most control, the age of retirement. The better theoretical studies also
recognize the most important institutional features of the economic environment
facing older individuals, such as the structures of available earnings and
retirement income streams. Empirical studies of older workers' labor—leisure
choices have developed along somewhat independent lines. Many studies have shown
that economic variables such as earnings and retirement income do influence
retirement behavior. However their results are often contradictory, because
(1) they usually do not focus on the life cycle of the optimal retirement
problem, and (2) they usually do not take explicit account of the complexities
of pension and earnings structures. The present paper remedies these deficien-
cies by developing an empirical retirement model derived directly from economic
life cycle theory, recognizing the special institutional features of wages
and pension structures available to older workers.
1
See, for instance, the Report of the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security
(1980).
2
A review of recent studies is contained in Mitchell and Fields (1982).2
Implementing an empirical retirement model imposes especially stringent
data requirements, since the analyst must know each individual's lifetime
budget set. In this study we use a new longitudinal data set containing
individuals' earnings histories and formulas determining their private pension
and Social Security benefits available at each possible retirement date.
While roughly similar data were utilized in two previous studies l, no previous
researchers have evaluated workers' full lifetime budget constraints using the net
earnings, private pensions and Social Security benefits available at each alter-
native retirement age. Therefore one contribution of this paper is to spell out
in detail for the first time the form and shape of lifetime income profiles. We
find, contrary to popular and professional opinion, that private pensions are not
always actuarially neutral; that Social Security benefits typically increase in
present value terms the longer retirement is postponed; and that for many people
in our sample, retirement income approaches and even exceeds net labor income.
In addition, this paper combines information on chosen retirement ages arid
budget constraints to infer how individuals respond to retirement incentive
structures. Several empirical models are discussed; the most complete, in our
view, is also that which confirms predictions from economic theory. Less
complete specifications often found in the literature are also examined and are
found to produce biased results.
Section II contains a theoretical discussion of the life cycle retirement
problem and provides comparative dynamic predictions. Section III reports on
the data set used in empirical analysis, and reviews our findings about the
lifetime budget constraint facing older workers. Results from empirical retire-
ment models are presented in Section IV and conclusions appear in Section V.
1Burkhauser (1979) examined a UAW pension plan, while Burtless and Hausman
(1981) focus on Civil Service retirement.3
II. Theoretical Framework
A. The Model
Severaltheoretical discussions in the literature recognize that retire-
ment behavior can be fruitfully modelled in the context of a life cycle
framework, where the decisionvariable isthe number of periods of work before
retiring.
1
Theindividual is assumed to maximize lifetime utility, a
functionof consumption and leisure in all remaining periods, subject to a
lifetime budget constraint. The constraint is determined by the monetary
payoffs to work (earnings) and nonwork (pension income from both private
pension plans and Social Security). This lifetime perspective suggests that
retirement patterns depend on: earnings at each age, the stream of private
pension and Social Security benefits available at each possible retirement age,
and the form and structure of preferences toward income and leisure.
While theorists have begun to analyze this problem, empirical studies
focusing on retirement have taken a rather different tack. Instead of asking
what determines workers' retirement ages, existing studies have focused
exclusively on cross sectional labor force participation patterns of older
workers. Indirectly, these two empirical issues are related, of course.
However, from a policy perspective, it is of great interest to model directly
the determinants of retirement ages. This perspective will prove useful in
evaluating proposed reforms of Social Security and pension systems. It is also
useful in illustrating some shortcomings in existing empirical models.
1
One of the earliest studies on the economics of retirement and pensions is
Feldstei&s (1974) work; Sheshinski's (1978) piece generalizes the model as
do Crawford and Lilien (1981). These and other theoretical contributions
are reviewed in Mitchell and Fields (1982).4
In the present analysis, we posit that individuals maximize lifetime
utility (U), a positive function of the present value of lifetime consumption
(C) and leisure, measured here by the length of the retirement period (RET).
As in most analyses of retirement behavior, we assume that older individuals
find it advantageous to work full time until some age and then retire
completely.Our model also assumes that individuals know their lifetime
budget sets and survival probability at each age.
2
Under these conditions, and assuming that lifetime consumption must equal
lifetime income, the individual confronts the following problem:
(1) Max U =U(PDVY, RET)
subject to
(2) PDVY =PDVE+ PDVP.
PDVY is the present value of lifetime income, and can be decomposedinto the sum
of lifetime earnings net of taxes and pension contributions (PDVE),and net income
from pensions (PDVP). The sum of earnings (Er) over the work period is:
This is clearly a simplifying assumption and could be relaxed in future
research. Only one published study, that by Boskin and Hurd (1978) has
addressed the part—time work option. Unpublished papers examining this
issue include those by Reimers (1977), Gustman and Steinmeler (1981),
Saminartino (1981), and Clark and Johnson (1980). Fewer than 10% of theindivid-
uals in our sample reported anyearñed income after acceptingtheir company's
pension, and only one individual earned enoughincome to attain the Social
Security earnings ceiling (in only one year). Incorporating part—time
work arrangements would greatly increase the complexity of the lifetime
budget constraint, and is apparently not required for the workers
represented in our data (described below).
2Crawford and Lilien (1981) analyze a theoretical model where changes in
uncertainty are allowed to affect retirement behavior. In the empirical
work below we assume individuals discount future income streams by
the relevant mortality probabilities.
Throughout this section the term "pension" is used to denote the sum of (net)
private pension and Social Security income.5
(3) PDVEfEte_r dt.where >0for all t.
Et should be expressed net of income taxes and of pension contributions, if any.
PDVP is the discounted sum of net pension benefits received during the retire—
ment period (from retirement R to death T, appropriately discounted for mortality):
(4a) PDVP =Ie dt.
R
A retiree's pension in year t is a function of the year itself (t), the age
he retires (R), and a pension amount factor (F):
(4b) =P(t,R, F).
The year itself (t) enters in, because pension benefits may vary with time, as for
instance in the cases of indexed Social Security benefits and union—negotiated in-
creases in retirement benefits for persons already retired. The age of retirement
(R) appears, because a person who retires later often receives larger annual pen-
sion benefits than he would if he retired earlier. In some pension plans the
factor (F) is a positive function of earnings; hence:
(4c) --> -->
Theother argument of the lifetime utility function is the length of the
retirement period (RET). RET is the difference between expected lifetime (T)
and age of retirement (R):
(5) RET =T —R.
Combining equations (1) through (5), the first order condition for a maximum
is obtained as an implicit function for the optimal ratirement date, R, expressed
in termsofthe effect of working the Rth year:0





At the optimal retirement age, an individual equates the utility value of
working one more year with the utility loss experienced by postponing retire-
ment. He gains the Rth year's earnings as well as higher pension benefits in
later years, which just offsets the loss in the Rth year's pension income and
1eisure. In general terms, then, the optimal retirement date is a function
of two types of variables. The first is the term in square brackets representing
the price of leisure, or the change in discounted income as retirement is post-
poned. The other variables and RET reflect taste factors. A general
solution for the optimal retirement age should thus have the following form:
(7) R =f(price of leisure, tastes for income and leisure)
Determining the effect of a change in the earnings or pension on an
individual's retirement age is feasible using comparative dynamics on equation
(6). Results from this analysis are summarized in Table 1. In general, we
find that increases in earnings and pension streams have ambiguous effects on
retirement. Ceteris paribus, more income should induce more leisure
consumption (if leisure is a normal good), so that higher earnings and pensions
can cause earlier retirement. However, if more income is gained asretirement
is postponed, higher income streams can also elicit more years ofwork through
an intertemporal substitution effect. The only unambiguous signis that of a
The price of leisure term differs conceptually from that used in previous
studies because it reflects the change in the present value of total net
income associated with later retirement, rather than just the change in
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change in the pension amount which raises the worker's income stream
without changing the slope of his lifetime budget set. Inthis case alone will
a higher pension unambiguously induce earlierretirement.1
The preceding paragraph addressed effects of changes in the budget set
for a specific individual. Of course we would expect thatthe same patterns
would hold in looking across a sample of individuals in a surveydata set
such as the one discussed below. In addition, if individual preferences
differ, workers with higher marginal utility for incomewould be more likely
to work longer (retire later) than those with alesser marginal preference
for income. Utility parameters cannot be observed directly,however, so they
must be proxied in empirical analysis.
B. Implications for Empirical Specifications
The general retirement model embodied in equation (7) hasseveral impli-
cations for empirical researchers wishing to evaluate theretirement response
to budget set parameters.
1. The age of retirement is a function of earnings and pension
nities in every period.2 Most previous empirical studies use onlycurrent
variables to explain retirement status; even the best studiesfocus only on two
Some of these results have been noted in thetheoretical literature; for
instance Burbidge and Robb (1980), Sheshinski (1978), Hemming(1977) and
Fields and Mitchell (1981) recognize that many of theseeffects are
theoretically ambiguous in sign. However empiricaldiscussions have
sometimes overlooked these ambiguities, claiming forinstance that higher
pensions always induce earlier retirement.
2This holds even if the dependent variable is a cross—sectional labor force
participation measure, as noted by Heckman and McCurdy (1980)in a
different context.9
of several alternative retirement ages,1 rather than looking at the complete
budget set. In addition, many studies include only a subset of earnings and
retirement income opportunities, and omit taxes and contributions from
consideration altogether. A complete specification of the lifetime budget
set requires that total net income available from postponing retirement be
examined.
2. The age of retirement is a non—linear function of earnings and
pension parameters. There are two kinds of nonlinearity to consider. The
first type arises because the expression defining the optimal retirement age,
equation (6), is in general quite complicated. A very simple example
demonstrates this point: take the case of a wealth maximizer facing linear
earnings and pensions functions, whose discount rate is zero: UPDVY,
I =m+ nt, and P =p+ q R. In this case the optimal retirement age can be
solved for explicitly as a function of the base earnings (m) and pension (p) as




The effect of a change in any one variable is not, even in this simple
model, independent of the levels of other variables. One could, of course,
linearize the determinants of retirement as:
(9) R =
b0+ b1 m + b2 n + b3 p + b4 q,
but this formulation ignores the dependence of earnings effects on pension
levels (and vice versa).
1
E.g., Burkhauser (1979) and Gordon and Blinder (1980).10
A more serious problem arises when pensions are functionally related to
earnings. This dependency is characteristic of Social Security and is also
relevant to many private pension schemes. In this event, because earnings
increases are automatically translated into pension increments, the coefficient
on earnings obtianed by regressing retirement on an earnings parameter is not
the ceteris paribus impact of labor income.
These types of interactions imply that retirement is not a linear function
of earnings and pension parameters entered separately. However, existing
empirical studies usually include labor and pension income as separate argu—
nients in linear models of older workers' behavior.
3. Effect of earnings and pensions on the age of retirement will depend
on taste parameters in complicated ways. To see this, we canderive the
optimal retirement date for an individual who values leisure as well as income.
Consider for instance a worker with a Cobb—Douglas utility function of the form:
(10) U =(PDVY)°(RET)
Even ifthe worker faced linear earnings and pension streams E =m+ntand P =
p÷qR,the optimal retirement age would be a quite complex function of the






It is evident from expression (11) thatthe effects of pensions and earnings on
retirement will in general depend on theindividual's taste parameters. This has11
not been recognized in previous empirical analysesof retirement, which typ-
ically assume additive separability betweenincome parameters and tastes of
the form.
R = (EconomicVariables) + 2 (Taste parameters)
4. Lookin across a sample of people, retirement ages will varyfor
two reasons. First, workers' budget constraints maydiffer and second, their
tastes for income and leisure may be different. Most previousstudies have
recognized that workers' current incomes differ, but frequentlyfail to
recognize that people also differ in the amountthat they could gain by
postponingretirement.1 These variations in budget constraints across people
arise because they face different earnings and pensionfunctions. Section III
examines these variations in our data directly. If, in addition,workers
differ according to the way they value income and leisure, tastevariations
must also be incorporated in an empirical evaluationof how retirement ages
responded to income changes. Empirical retirement analysisto date has also not
focused on this sort ofvariation.2 In Section IV below, we address this issue
directly.
1Burkhauser (1979) recognizes that pension benefits change asretirement is
postponed, and that this amount varies acrossworkers. However, that
paper does not take into account the factthat the other components of
workers' total lifetime budget sets ———discountedearnings and Social
Security benefit streams ———alsochange as retirement is postponed.
2Gordon and Blinder (1980) and Zabalza et al (1980) both utilizemodels where
workers' preferences for retirement are allowed to vary across people.
This is similar in spirit to the work by Burtless and Hausman (1978) in
another context. In all cases, however, the authors (continued on next page)12
III.Data Description and the Lifetime Budget Constraint
One reason that previous researchers have not examined the lifetime
budget constraint of older workers in great depth is thatinformation on
total retirement income is extremely difficult to obtain. The most
frequently used source, the Retirement History Survey, does not provide
formulas for computing private pension benefits at alternative retirement
ages; other data sets tend to be deficientin other respects. The analysis
in the present paper utilizes a new data set which contains allthe elements
required to construct the requisite income streams foreach worker. This
section describes the data source and the structure of thelifetime budget
set. Then, in Section IV, we show that variations inthe budget constraint
are indeed associated with ages of retirement inthe ways predicted by theory.
A. Data Source and the Sample Under Analysis
In 1978, the U.S. Department of Laborselected a sample of private
pension plans that filed SummaryPlan Descriptions (SPDs) under the
Employee Retirement Income SecurityAct of 1974 (ERISA). The SPDs contained
information on pension formulas used todetermine retirement benefits. Each
sample plan also provided data on all pensionrecipients including the birth
year and year of retirement.Employer—provided data were then mergedwith
individual Social Security records to obtain earningshistories and basic demo-
graphic information.
2(continued from preceding page) focus on the probabilityof being in the
labor force at a single survey date, ratherthan on the age of retirement
of central concern here.13
Establishing the exact pension formulas proved unexpectedly complicated,
and has led us to analyze the workers in one particular pension plan in this
paper.
1
The structure of pension benefits in this company is sketched in
subsection B below. The resultant lifetime budget set is discussed in sub-
section C.
Working with this one pension plan, for which the structure of pension
benefits is well understood, we set out to produce a sample of retirees for
whom age of retirement could be related to earnings, private pension income,
and Social Security benefits. We sought to avoid sample truncation bias arising
from two sources. One such source is that persons who had retired from the
firm, but who already had died by 1978, were not included in the recipient
file. This suggested choosing a sample young enough to minimize sample trun-
cation on account of mortality. On the other hand, individuals who were
elegible to retire, but who had not yet retired, were not included in the
pension recipient file either. This argues for choosing a sample that is
old enough to minimize sample truncation on account of incomplete work spells.
The compromise adopted here focuses on one age group of workers born in
1909 and 1910. These individuals were thus 68 or 69 years old in 1978 when
the survey data were gathered, and had passed the mandatory retirement age at
the firm in question, assuring that their work spells were completed. Some
(unknown) amount of mortality bias remains but it is expected to be small.
While the survey is quite informative on retirees' behavior, it contains
no information on spouses' work status. Since this omission is much more serious
for women than for men, the analysis was limited to males only. The resultant
sample consists of 390 males born in 1909 and 1910, who retired between the
ages of 60 and 68.
1In future work we plan to extend the analyses to other companies.14
B. The Private Pension Structure in Company X
The pension structure in Company X is negotiated every three yearsand
written into a contract with the United Automobile Workers union(UAW). The
formula negotiated in the early 1970s, when the workers in our sample were
about 60 years of age and were presumably deciding when to retire, varied depend-
ing on age and/or years of service. To illustrate, the followingrules applied
to an individual who started work at Company X at age 30:
i. If he retires after age 60, but before age 62: his pension
benefit is $6,000 per year until age 62 and $5,400 per
year from 62 to 64; thereafter, itis [$90 x yrs. of service
less (.04 *thedifference between the retirement age and
62)] + $63.60.
ii. If he retires after age 62, but before age 65: his pension
benefit is $5,400 per year until age 65; thereafter, it is
[$90 x yrs. of service] + $63.60.
iii. If he retires at age 65 or later: his pension benefitis
[$90 *yrs.of service] + $63.60.
Table 2 presents several streams of annual pension benefitsavailable to a
hypothetical worker at selected retirement ages,based on these rules.
One remarkable feature of this private pension structureis that at age
62, a retiree actually gets less in initial pensionbenefits per year than at
age 61. The same sort of benefitdecrease occurs if the worker postpones
retirement from age 64 to 65. A partial explanation maybe found for this by
recognizing that the pension plan is de facto integratedwith Social Security.
In other words, though benefits are not formallyreduced when Social Security
recipiency begins, the perception is clearlythat workers can claim full
Social Security benefits at age 65, and thus are providedwith supplemental
private benefits until Social Security commences.The fallacy of thinking that
annual pension benefits are monotonically increasing functionsof time worked
is clearly indicated in these numbers.Table 2.
Streams of Pension Benefits at Alternate Retirement Ages for a Hypothetical Worker
Who Joined Company X at Age 30
(Based on Union Contract in Effect in 1972)
Thepensionbenefithe gets ateach ageis:
66 67 68 60 61 62 63 64 65
If he retires at age 60: 6000 60005400540054002547.602547.602547.602547.60 etc.
If heretires at age 62: 0 0 54005400 54002943.602943.602943.602943.60etc.
If heretires at age 65: 0 0 0 0 03213.603213.603213.603213.60 etc.
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C. The Lifetime Budget Set
Space permits us to only briefly summarize the specific assumptions
1
that went into the creation of the lifetime budget set.Previous empirical
analysts have not recognized the importance of modelling older workers'
expectations about the institutional environment they are likely to face in
the future. In contrast, our approach develops each individual's budget con-
straint assuming that his best estimate of changes in future earnings, taxes,
Social Security and pension opportunities would be forecast on the basis
2
of actual changes expecrienced during the decade prior to retirement. It
was also assumed that individuals considering retirement prospects would
discount future income promises by the probability of not surviving to that
age. In addition, all future income streams werediscounted at a nominal
rate of 5%3
1Details are available from the authors on request.
2
Both Social Security and private pension benefits had been increasing at
positive real rates throughout the 1960's, so that the constant nominal
(declining real) benefit stream assumed in other studies would clearly be
inconsistent with expectations. Formulating other models of expectations
is left to future work.
Sensitivity analyses with other discount rates produced budget constraints
virtually identical in shape to those obtained with the 5% rate.17
Earlier we noted that income opportunities for each possible retirement
age have not been calculated previously in empirical work.1 Mean values for
the annual amounts appearing in the first three rows and in present discounted
value (PDV) terms in the following three rows. Total lifetime income is
given in Row (7).
Several features of the lifetime budget set stand out. First, examine
Row (7). Discounted lifetime income always increases in real terms as
ment is postponed. The lifetime budget profile is monotonically increasing
because in each year the sum of earnings plus (or minus) the change in future
pension income is greater than the loss of the current year's pension if re-
tirement is postponed. (See the term in brackets in equation (6))
The components of the budget set also are of interest. For obvious
reasons, people who retire later have higher cumulative real earnings (Row 7).
Later retirement also translates into a higher stream of private pension
benefits until age 64, as is evident in row (5); this pattern contrasts with
Lazear's (1981) claim that private pension wealth falls as retirement is de—
layed. In general, we conclude that the private pension plan is not
ally neutral; the PDV of net private pension income is an inverted—U—shaped
function of age of retirement. Pension wealth does decline after age 64, in
this plan; however, this relatively early peak to private pension wealth
contradicts both Burkhauser and Quinn's (1980) proposition that pension
wealth increases until mandatory retirement, since in this firm age 68 is the
obligatory retirement age, and Bulow's 0979) claim that pension wealth de—
dines eacE year retirement is postponed.
1
Further, previous studies typically do not subract income taxes from earnings
and private pensions, nor Social Security contributions from earned income.
Both adjustments have been made here.18
Table 3.
Elements of the Lifetime Budget Set for the Mean Individual
in Company X; As Expected at Age 60
Minual Variables at AgeX:
(1)Net earnings 77067866833486768837 8978919094359686
(2) First Year's Net
Private Pension 400241603875397740683281361039764367
(3) First Year's Social
Security* 167618422020239328253305364140074412
PDVs if the Individual Retires at That Age:
(4) PDV Net Earnings 07316 14512 21450 27981 34100 39857 45276 50359
(5) PDV Net Private
Pension 57533 58506 59092 60205 61425 55431 54893 54355 53629
(6) PDV Social
Security 27898 31647 34689 38754 43031 47189 48597 49823 50912
(7) PDV Net Lifetime
Income 86331 V469 108293 120409 132437 136720 143347. 149454154900
(=(4)+( 5) +( 6) )
* SocialSecurity benefits are computed as of the yearof first eligibility.
Thus an individual retiring at age 60 would not begin receivingbenefits until
attaining age 62.19
Unlike for the private pension plan, the lifetime stream of Social Security
benefits continues to rise in present value terms as retirement is postponed,
as row (6) indicates. In other words, as workers postpone retirement, their
rising real earnings combine with Social Security benefit rules to raise annual
Social Security benefits at a faster rate than expected remaining lifetime
declines. Thus, contrary to the popular belief that the Social Security
System is actuarially neutral until age 65 and actuarially disadvantageous
thereafter, we find that deferring retirement produces successively higher
values of Social Security wealth)
Another conclusion from Table 3 is that the budget constraint is not linear.
The gains to deferring retirement range from a high of about $12,000 for working
the 63rd year of life, to a low of about $6,600 for working the 65th year.
This is a function of the non—linearities in the private pension plan, Social
Security and net earnings profiles and the interactions among them. These
interactions have not been recognized in previous attempts to construct the
lifetime budget set facing older workers.
A final observation on Table 3 is that the average ratio of pension benefits
to earnings (referred to as the "replacement rate" in the literature) varies
a great deal across ages. In our data the ratio of net private pensions to net
earnings ranges from 37 to 53%, while the Social Security replacement rate spans
the range from 24 to 47%. The mean ratio of total net retirement income to net
earnings in our sample stands at 74% for retirement at age 60, and rises to 91%
if the worker waited until age 68 to retire.2 To our knowledge no previous
study has found replacement rates of this magnitude, because no analysis has
focused on after—tax total income.
Recent reforms in the Social Security rules may have modified this pattern;
see Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1980) and 3u:khaucer and :urner (1981).
2
One sixth of the workers in our sample would have received retirement
income greater than or equal to 95% of net earnings had they retired at
age 62; over one third would have experienced a replacement ratio of this
magnitude if they had waited until age 68.20
IV.EmpiricalDeterminants of Retirement Behvi9
The theoretical model of determinants of retirement presentedin Section II
suggested several lessons for empirical analysis. Oneconclusion we drew is that
retirement must be modelled as a function of total income changes asretire-
ment is postponed. A natural way to summarize this informationin ..mpirical work
is to measure the change in the present vilue of incomeavailable at the earliest
possible retirement age and at the age of mandatoryretirement.1 In
empirical work below, we refer to this variable as YSLOPE,and treat it as
a price ——itis the amount of income foregone in favor of leisure ifthe
worker retires earlier rather than later.
This formulation has several advantages over those available inthe
literature. Because it includes net earnings, net private pensionsand Social
Security, it is a more complete specification of the budget set than in any
previous empirical retirement study, since data limitations have prevented
other analysts from combining all three elements of the lifetime budget con-
straint into a total income term. This approach also incorporates the
functional dependence of changes in retirement income on earnings prior to
retirement, in contrast to previous formulations. Finally, the coefficient
of YSLOPE in a retirement model has a natural interpretation: it represents
the (unconipensated) effect of a change in the value of additional
leisure on the age of retirement. In general therefore, YSLOPE may be
associated with later retirement (if the substitution effect dominates)
or earlier retirement (if the income effect is stronger). Aswith most
1Other approximations to the slope of the lifetime budget constraint as
retirement is postponed could be computed since the budget set is non-
linear, but sensitivity analysis we have performed indicates that this
would not materially affect results as described below.21
regressions of a quantity on its own price, we expect a negative relationship
even though we are looking at uncompensated effects. In the age—of—retirement
model, those who forego more income by retiring earlier would, we hypothesize,
tend to work longer, producing a positive coefficient on YSLOPE.
In Section II it was also suggested that differences in tastes could
explain some additional variation in retirement ages, ceteris paribus. Of
course, workers' marginal utility parameters are not directly observable, and
thus must be proxied by other variables. The best proxy available to us is
income. If leisure is a normal good, one would expect that higher income
would be associated with earlier retirement for three reasons. Because of an
ordinary income effect, higher income people would buy more leisure. Also,
because of diminishing marginal utility of income, higher income people would
value extra income less than would poorer people. Thirdly, in a household
production context, higher income people are apt to own more goods to comple-
ment their retirement years (e.g., sailboats, multiple homes for various seasons)
and hence have higher marginal utility of leisure years than do lower income
persons. In the analysis below, we control for such taste variation with YBASE,
the worker's total income at the earliest possible retirement age (age 60 for
this sample). It is hypothesized to have a negative coefficient in an age—of--
ret irement regression.
1
The results in Table 4 clearly demonstrate that retirement behavior is
responsive to the structures of earnings and retirement incentives. Column 1
reports the relationship between the age of retirement and the variable we claim
1
We assume that remaining variation is distributed independently of included
variables. We also explored models where other demographic variables such
race were incorporated, but they proved to be virtually identical to those
discussed below. In other samples one might wish to incorporate additional
taste proxies; however, our data set is quite homogeneous since it includes
only blue collar workers covered by a IJAW contract, employed by one firm, all
born in the same period. It is therefore not surprising that demographic var—
iables proved insignificant in empirical analysis.22
is the theoretically correct "price" term, YSLOPE, as well as the variable
proxying for the marginal utility of income, YBASE. It is evident that
people who have more income retire earlier, confirming the hypothesis that
retirement years are a normal good. In addition it appears that the substi-
tution effect dominates the income effect, since people who have more to gain
by postponing retirement indeed retire later, ceteris paribus. Both effects
are statistically significant with the theoretically anticipated signs.
Sensitivity analysis on the basic model reveals that most alternative
formulations affect results very little if at all. Slightly different
specifications of YSLOPE produce about the same elasticities as those reported
above; Column (2) for instance uses the change in total income as retirement is
postponed from 60 to 65 rather than 68, as in the first column. Interacting
YBASE and YSLOPE in the third column proves less interesting. The signs and
magnitudes of the effects are roughly similar to those in the first two
columns, but multicollinearity introduced at this step increases standard errors.
At conventional significance levels, the hypothesis that price and proxies for
tastes interact (in the way specified by Column 3) must be rejected.
As we have argued earlier, a model compatible with a life cycle approach
to the retirement problem is one that incorporates all income opportunities
from alternative retirement dates and their interactions as in Columns (1—3).
However, less complete specifications are often used in the literature because
of data limitations or lack of a firm life cycle foundation, and it is of inter-
est to inquire what we would find if other approaches had been used to address
the age of retirement problem. Columns (4—6) speak to this question. The
fourth equation reflects a rather widespread view that retirement depends on
pension and Social Security wealth, and that these variables enter additively
separably. As we have seen above, the dependence of retirement on pensionandTable 4.
Empirical Results: Determinants of
Retirement Ages: N390
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Variable* Mean Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
YBASE 86.07 _.Oll*—.010k—.026
(.004) (.004) (.017)
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*Variable Definitions on next page
23*Varjable Definitions:
All variables expressed in thousands of dollarsunless noted otherwise.
PDV Present Discounted Value, computed asdescribed in text
ThASE PDVYat age 60
YSLOPE PDVY68—PDVY6O for all but Column (2); PDVY65—PDVY6Ofor
Column (2)
YBASE*YSLOPE Interaction between the two variables(in millions
of dollars)
PDVPEN65 PDV of net private pension benefits if workerretired at
age 65
PDVSS65 PDV of Social Security benefits if workerretired at age 65
NETERN6O Annual net earnings level at age 60
NETPEN6O Annual net pension level at age 60
SS6O Annual Social Security level worker would eventuallyreceive




PEVPEN6O PDV of net private pension if worker retiredat age 60





Social Security wealth is soniewhat ill—defined since thepresent values of
?ension and Social Security wealth change with retirement age. Nonetheless,
we can arbitrarily select age 65 to compute discounted streams of retirement
income, and also include the base level of earnings as an explanatory factor.'
Alternatively, we might use base year pension and earnings levels as well as
changes in these levels if the worker defers retirement until age 65; see
column 5. The model in column 6 includes all the components of column 2 in
present value terms but enters them linearly instead of collapsing them in
the total income concept used earlier.
When analysts have used earnings levels in previous empirical studies,
both positive and negative effects on retirement have been discerned.2 Both
Columns 4 and 5 suggest that higher base earnings induce more work and later
retirement. This directly contradicts the evidence provided by the model of
Column 1, where we found that a rise in base income from any source, including
earnings, induces earlier retirement, as expected if leisure is a normal good.
Thus, if we had used the ad hoc specifications in Columns 4 and 5 rather than
the life cycle model of column 1, we would have reached the implausible con-
clusion that leisure is not a normal good.
Other types of increases in base income should also induce earlier re-
tirement according to the conceptual model of Section II, but one would not
This equation is thus more complete than many previous models because both
pension and earnings are included and are net of taxes and contributions.
as well. It remains incomplete, of course, as compared to Column 1, for
the reasons noted in the text.
2
Mitchell and Fields (1982) review findings from existing studies.26
arrive at this conclusion based on previousresults in the literature nor from
the improperly specified models in columns5 and 6. In fact columns 5 and 6,
if believed, would indicate that raising pensionand Social Security amounts
at the earliest retirement age haveconflicting effects: a more generous
private pension level or stream appearsto be significantly associated with
earlier retirement but the opposite sign,though insignificant, is detected
for Social Security. But, once again,
these results are derived from a
linear, non_interactive specificationlacking theoretical justification.
Consider now the gain in lifetime income if retirementis postponed.
According to theory, increases in the amountof income associated with post-
poning retirement should induce laterretirement. This conclusion was borne
out empirically in Regressions 1 and 2. Howeverthis conclusion would not
have been reached from differently specifiedmodels. In column 5, faster
earnings growth appears to induce later retirement,but more generous pension
and Social Security adjustments as retirement is postponed appearto induce
earlier retirement. On the other hand, regression6 seems to indicate that
workers retire earlier if the pension stream risesbut later if earnings or
Social Security streams increase. Not only are these findingsmutually in—
consistenet, but they are also at odds withmodels using the more conceptually
appealing lifetime budget constraintwhich includes total income.
V. Conclusion
This paper suggest that older workers respond tothe structure of
earnings, private pensions and Social Securityin ways that are consistent
with a life cycle labor supply formulation. The implicationsof a life cycle27
model are drawn out in the context of the special institutional features
characterizing retirement income, and comparative dynamic predictions are
derived. This formulation provides guidance for empirical modelling of re—
tirement behavior, which we incorporate in our estimation equations. Data from
a new survey are used to implement the theoretically preferred empirical model;
in addition a number of alternate empirical equations are estimated. In de-
veloping the data we highlight a number of interesting and little known facts
about older workers' lifetime budget sets. Retirement ages among workers in our
sample respond in a manner compatible with theory; alternative specifications
similar to those found in the literature do not. We find: (1) Higher base in-
come induces earlier retirement. (2) Those who have more to gain by postponing
retirement, retire later.References
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